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Struggle For Reason And Accountability:
Current Concepts Of Causation,
Aggravation And Substantial Evidence In
Occupational Disease Claims
Stephen I. Richman*
Reason is the life of the law; nay, the common law itself is
nothing else but reason

..

.

. The law .. .is perfection of

reason."
Few legal scholars disagree with the assumption that Pennsylvania's legal system is based upon reason. Recent opinions by Pennsylvania courts' - workers' compensation occupational disease cases
which have decided issues of scope of appellate review, causation and
aggravation - have undermined that assumption. They have done
this by impairing accountability and promoting irrationality. An
analysis of these decisions, and the common threat to rationem rei
which they pose, is this article's purpose.
I.

Scope of Appellate Review - Since Cushey

The scope of review in workmen's compensation appeals is
somewhat circumscribed. Where a party with the burden of proof
has prevailed in a proceeding before the referee and no additional
evidence is taken by the Appeal Board, the scope of appellate review
is limited to determining whether or not constitutional rights have
been violated, errors of law have been committed, or necessary findings are unsupported by sufficient, competent and "substantial
evidence." 2
Substantial evidence has been defined as "such relevant eviThe author is a partner in the Ceisler/Richman Law Firm in Washington, PA; member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
I. Sir Edward Coke, First Institute (1668).
2. Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. 77, § 853 (Purdon
Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as PWCA]; Administrative Agency Law, 2 PA. CONS. STAT. §
704 (1982) [hereinafter cited as AALJ; Hilliard v. William Penn Hotel, 49 Pa. Commw. 96,
468 A.2d 881 (1983).

dence as a reasonable min4 might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.' 3 It has also been described as "that evidence including
the inferences therefrom which a reasonable man, acting reasonably,
might use in reaching a decision; but, if a reasonable man acting
reasonably, could not have reached the decision from the evidence
and its inferences, then the decision is not supported by substantial
evidence." 4 Because the appellate reviewer must determine whether
the referee's findings are supported by substantial evidence the "appellate review must focus on whether there is rational support in the
record, when reviewed as a whole, for the agency action." 5 The rules
of limited appellate review "must be qualified by the compensation
authorities' obligation
to deal rationally and coherently with the evi6
dence before them."
The substantial evidence standard of review, applicable to workmen's compensation appeals since enactment of the Administrative
Agency Law 7 departs significantly from the earlier review standard
established in Universal Cyclops Steel Corp. v. Krawczynski.8 Under
Cyclops, a referee's decision, even if irrational, required affirmance
as long as it was based upon competent, i.e., admissible, evidence.
That a reasonable mind could not rationally conclude as the referee
had was immaterial if the record nonetheless contained competent
evidence to support the findings. 9 By requiring the referee's findings
to be supported by substantial evidence, the Administrative Agency
Law mandates reversal upon appellate review, even when the finding
is supported by competent evidence, if a reasonable man could not
have reached the same conclusion as the referee.
Proper appellate review, therefore, should require something
greater than a standard of review which affects disdain for the reasoning of the referee in favor of a mechanical and uncritical inventory of the evidence to see if there is any "competent" evidence to
support the finding of the referee. The whole record should be examined by the appellate reviewer to determine whether, from all of
the evidence, the result reached by the referee could be rationally
reached.
To assist in this determination, the referee should rationally jus3. Republic Steel Corp. v. Shinsky, 492 Pa. 1, 5, 421 A.2d 1060, 1062 (1980); Yuhas
v. City of Pittsburgh, 82 Pa. Commw. 390, 392, 476 A.2d 1377, 1379 (1984).
4. Peoples Gas Co. v. Fitzmaurice, 33 Pa. Commw. 530, 533 n.I, 382 A.2d 484, 486
n.I(1978).
5. Republic Steel Corp. v. Shinsky, 492 Pa. at 5, 421 A.2d at 1063 (1980).
6. Yuhas v. City of Pittsburgh, 82 Pa. Commw. at 394, 476 A.2d at 1380.
7. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 704 (1982); Stover v. Wheeling - Pittsburgh Steel, 85 Pa.
Commw. 632, 482 A.2d 1364 (1984).
8. 91 Pa. Commw. 176, 305 A.2d 757 (1973).
9. Id. See also Page's Dep't Store v. Velardi, 464 Pa. 276, 346 A.2d 556 (1975).

tify his decision. Where his decision is based upon disputed evidence,
the explanation should include cogent and nonevasive reasons for
what he accepted and rejected. 1" These requirements rest on the following public policy grounds: (a) to inform litigants;1 1 (b) to help
parties plan their cases for appeal; (c) to discourage meritless appeals by demonstrating that the decision is supported by sound rea-

soning; (d) to facilitate appellate review by informing the appellate
reviewer of the basis of the referee's decision;12 (e) to insure that a
careful examination of the evidence, rather than visceral inclinations
or idiosyncratic biases, guided the referee's decision; and (f) to promote more uniform and equitable decision-making by establishing
precedents.

Support for these views exists in Pennsylvania's court system.
Indeed, the referee has been called "the trial judge of the workmen's

compensation system."1 3 In a bench trial, the decision of the trial
judge must include a statement of "the grounds for selecting the

particular findings, and the reasoning process by which the judge
reached his ultimate conclusion.'
Even where fact finding is by a
jury, the need for total or substantial consensus compels individual

jurors to present their reasoning to fellow jurors in a reasonable and
hence persuasive manner. Like a judge in a bench trial and a juror
during jury deliberations, the referee should be required to explain

the bases of his findings.
To what extent does Pennsylvania law require rational decision-

making with supporting reasons from a workers' compensation referee?15 In the case of ConsolidationCoal Co. v. Cushey,' this important question was presented but evaded.
In Cushey, the claimant's medical expert "testified that although a series of tests conducted on the 'claimant' showed normal
readings and no evidence of pulmonary distress, the 'claimant' had a
10. Wier ex rel. Weir v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 955 (3rd. Cir. 1984); Cotter v. Harris, 642
F.2d 700 (3d. Cir. 1981); Perez v. United States Steel Corp., Ind. 426 N.E.2d 29
(Ind. 1981).
I. DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 16.05 (1958). "[A] disappointed party
. . .deserves to have the satisfaction of knowing why he lost his case." Id.
12. United States v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. R., 294 U.S. 499, 510-11 (1935); City
of Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685, 694-95 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
13. Myers v. Pa. Dep't of Labor & Industry, 312 Pa. Super. 61, 458 A.2d 235 (1983).
14. Cady v. Weber, 317 Pa. Super. 481, 486, 464 A.2d 423, 426 (1983) (citing
Commw. ex rel. Newcomer v. King, 301 Pa. Super. 239, 245, 447 A.2d 630, 633 (1982)). See
also Morris v. Benson & Benson, Inc., 321 Pa. Super. 15, 467 A.2d 870 (1983).
15. AAL, 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 507.
16. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Cushey, 86 Pa. Commw. 518, 485 A.2d 538 (1984).
"[W]hile the referee's findings of fact need not be so specific as to provide a thorough explanation of his thought processes they must be sufficient to demonstrate that the fact-finding function was performed and to permit the reviewing court to conclusions." Id. at 523, 485 A.2d at
540 (citing Marcks v. W.C.A.B., 65 Pa. Commw. 107, 111, 442 A.2d 9, 11 (1982)).

totally disabling respiratory condition. ' t It is not rational to find
total pulmonary disability in the presence of normal pulmonary
function. Nevertheless, the referee, in a cryptic decision, did find total pulmonary disability. He explained only that he found the doctor's opinion credible and accepted it. Affirming the referee's decision, the Commonwealth Court rejected the Appeal Board's
characterization of the doctor's testimony as "incredulous." The
Commonwealth Court found that the referee's decision was supported by "substantial evidence" and, therefore, could not be disturbed on appeal. 18
The Cushey court did not apply or even refer to the legal requirements of "substantial evidence" - to wit, that the evidence be
of the kind which a reasonable man might use in reaching a decision.
Nor could it! In the face of normal pulmonary function, how could
an opinion of total pulmonary disability be evidence of the kind
which a reasonable man might use in reaching a decision? Sub silentio, Cushey redefined substantial evidence to mean any competent
evidence.
The Cushey decision means that the opinion of a medical expert
qualifies as "substantial evidence" even when it is senseless. As "substantial evidence," the irrational medical opinion renders unreviewable the finding based upon it, although that finding is also senseless.
The referee has no responsibility to explain his irrational finding or
why he accepted the irrational medical opinion. 18 't He performs his
fact-finding function without accountability. The decision in Cushey
rejects the rule of reason; it flouts liberty's ancient exhortation for "a
government of laws, and not of men."' 9
II.

Causation-Since Kusenko

By making the referee unaccountable for his fact finding functions, Cushey sullied the system for litigating occupational disease
claims. Though subtle, the taint is clearly seen upon analysis of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent opinion concerning death due
to multiple causes.
Since occupational disease has become the leading cause of
work-related disability,2" issues of etiology and causation, usually un17. Id. at 520, 485 A.2d at 539.
18. Id.
18.1. See Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. W.C.A.B. (Krasovec), No. 2230 C.D., slip op.
(Pa. Commw. Feb. 25th, 1986). The Krasovec case holds that a workmen's compensation referee "is not required to provide any reason for accepting one medical opinion over another."
19. Adams J, Original Draft of Massachusetts Constitution (1779).
20. National Institute For Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Leading WorkRelated Diseases and Injuries. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report; 1983-1984. Reprinted from: Vol. 32, Nos. 2, 4; Vol. 33, Nos. 9, 16.

important in cases of traumatic injury but often determinative in occupational disease claims, are now much disputed. Employer liability
under the statute is premised upon personal injury or death in the
course of employment.2 1 According to the Labor Department, however, "[m]any occupational diseases, particularly respiratory illness,
exhibit clinical symptoms indistinguishable from 'ordinary diseases
of life.' "'22 Consequently, ninety percent of respiratory disease
claims are litigated. 3 Issues of causation"' and etiology2" are controverted in over seventy-five percent of the litigated cases.2"
Throughout the nation, adjudicators of claims for death or disability attributable to multiple diseases regularly face a perplexing
question: When is contribution by occupational disease enough to
support a finding that the occupation "caused" death or disability?
In workers' compensation law, the issue is far from settled. The currently confused state of federal black lung law well illustrates the
point. Depending on which circuit court of appeals has jurisdiction
over the case, federal black lung law can require that death or disability is due to pneumoconiosis "in and of itself'; 2 7 or that pneumoconiosis is a "significant cause"; 2 8 or that pneumoconiosis is merely a
"contributing cause."12 9
Very recently, this same dilemma was faced by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Kusenko v. Republic Steel Corp.,"n a case
of national importance. Kusenko involved a survivor's claim of a
widow whose husband, a coal miner, contacted concomitantly both
lethal lung cancer and coal worker's pneumoconiosis. The referee
awarded benefits based upon an opinion of the claimant's expert that
coal worker's pneumoconiosis contributed to the miner's death only
in the sense that the miner became debilitated and weakened by the
pneumoconiosis and was, therefore, less able to "ward off the bad
effects" of the lethal cancer. The court identified the issue by asking:
"[W]hen a non-compensable disease of life which is unrelated to
21.

PA. STAT. ANN. 77, § 431.

22.

U.S.

DEP'T OF LABOR, PUB.

TIONAL DISEASES 2 (1980).
23. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PUB.

No. L 1.2:W89/13, AN
No. L 1.2:Oc1/9,

INTERIM REPORT ON OCCUPA-

PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERDEPART-

MENTAL WORKERS' COMPENSATION TASK FORCE. Is THERE A BETTER WAY? REPORT TO THE

PRESIDENT 19 (1977).

24. "Causation" refers to whether occupational disease caused the personal injury or
death.
25. "Etiology" refers to whether an occupation caused the disease.
26. Proceedings of the Conference on Workers' Compensation and Workplace Liability, (Theberge LJ, Hollenshead MH, Muth RJ, Wyerman JK, Wuerthner JJ, Jr., eds.) 365-71
(1981).
27. Jones v. New River Co., 3 BLR 1-199 (1981).
28. Shaw v. Bradford Coal Co., 7 BLR 1-462 (1984).
29. Gibas v. Saginaw Mining Co., 748 F.2d 1112 (6th Cir. 1984).
30. Kusenko v. Republic Steel Corporation, 506 Pa. 104, 484 A.2d 374 (1984).

work intervenes and death results, what role must the occupational
disease play so that benefits are forthcoming?"
The decision required construction of Section 411(2) of the
Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act which provides in part,
"[W]henever occupational disease is the basis for compensation, for
disability or death under the act, it shall apply only to disability or
death resultingfrom such disease ....
Prior to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion in Kusenko,
Pennsylvania courts had served up a cafeteria-style choice of interpretations of the phrase "resulting from." Specifically, in cases of
fatal multiple disease claims, the clause was variously interpreted to
mean: (1) that occupational disease must be the sole and direct
cause of death; (2) that occupational disease must in and of itself
cause death; (3) that occupational disease must be the immediate
cause of death; (4) that the contribution by occupational disease
must equal that of non-occupational disease; (5) that occupational
disease must be a substantial contributingfactor among secondary
causes; and (6) that death "results from" occupational disease whenever there exists any causal relationship between occupational disease and death.3 3
The inconsistent constructions led to considerable confusion.
Different panels of the Commonwealth Court applied different rules.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, unable to fashion a majority for
any rule, was able to issue only a plurality opinion. The Kusenko
appeal thus presented to the court an important opportunity to establish and clarify a new and "definitive standard."
Reference to decisions of courts in other states offered the court
little guidance. Most foreign jurisdictions adopted similar confusing
criteria. 3s Moreover, the Commonwealth Court in Kusenko found
that evidence that occupational disease merely made the worker less
able to ward off effects of lethal cancer was sufficient to sustain an
award of benefits. On appeal, amici curiae5 argued that this stanId. at 106, 484 A.2d at 376.
PA. STAT. ANN. 77, § 411(2) (emphasis added).
33. Stander, Proving Causation In Multiple-Disease Cases, PENNSYLVANIA LAW
JOURNAL-REPORTER, December 17, 1984 at I. (An excellent historical and analytical review,
with citations, of the cases preceding Kusenko is presented.)
34. For example: in North Carolina, the test is significant causal factor; in Mississippi,
it is material contributing factor; and in Alaska, major contributing factor. Wyoming requires
the occupational disease to be the direct cause of disability. What each of these terms means is
uncertain. They are wholly subjective and highly ambiguous. See Dowdy v. Fieldcrest Mills,
Inc., 308 N.C. 701, 304 S.E.2d 215 (1983); Jenkins v. Ogletree Farm Supply, 291 So. 2d 560
(Miss. 1974); Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312 (Alaska 1981); Olson v. Federal Am. Partners, 567 P.2d 710 (Wyo. 1977).
35. Brief for Amici Curiae at 31, Kusenko, 506 Pa. 104, 484 A.2d 374. The brief was
filed by Bethlehem Steel Corp., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp., Westmoreland Casualty Co.,
McGraw-Edison Co., Pennsylvania Aggregate & Concrete Association, Emway Resources,
31.

32. PWCA,

dard was preposterous; by it, every death and every disability of
workers having but the mildest occupational disease would be compensable. Under a system intended to compensate only for death or
disability arising out of employment, should a worker with asymptomatic simple pneumoconiosis receive compensation after being
struck by a car, because his occupational lung disease made him less
able to "ward off the bad effects" of his traumatic injury?
In their text on occupational disease, Barth and Hunt discuss
the problem of compensation under these circumstances. Citing a
North Carolina decision in which the court upheld an award of benefits to an employee who died from a malignant brain tumor unrelated to his coexistent asbestosis, the authors explain the dilemma in
these cases this way:
Clearly the underlying condition could be expected to weaken
the employee and hasten his death but one wonders whether any
pre-existing condition would not have contributed to the weakening of the human organism when confronted with such a malignancy . . . . It does not seem unreasonable to suppose that almost any underlying disease condition can hasten or accelerate
the disabling or fatal effects of serious diseases. Decision making
in this area by workers' compensation authorities involves a
combination of difficult technical-scientific matters and some
philosophical questions about the purpose of the program."
Unfortunately, Barth and Hunt failed to recommend a solution
to this problem. In Kusenko, however, amici curiae did propose one.
The amici first attempted to demonstrate to the court that formulations set forth in precedents of both Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions should be discarded.37 Phrases like "material contributing factor," "significant contributing factor" and "major contributing
factor" have little meaning when assessing pathophysiological events
leading to death or disability. Words such as "major," "substantial"
and "material" are wholly subjective and are thus subject to gross
deviation. They do not provide guidance or instruction to the referees, to the expert witnesses, or to the litigants in determining
whether death or disability resulted from occupational disease.
Amici argued further that a test based upon a subjective standard of causation produces a system of compensation in which different results may be reached under identical factual situations. One of
two fellow workers suffering the same disabling impairment caused
by the same conditions may be denied an award which the other
Div. of Amoco Oil Company, and Cooper Industries.
36.

BARTH &

HUNT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION

AND WORK-RELATED ILLNESSES AND

118 (1980) [hereinafter cited as BARTH & HUNT].
37. Brief For Amici Curiae at 30-31, Kusenko, 506 Pa. 104, 484 A.2d 374.

DISEASES,

receives. Such a situation is fundamentally unfair to claimants and
employers. 38
Amici urged the court to lead the way for the nation by adopting a standard of causation which would require the medical expert
to explain how and why occupational disease contributed in "an active way" to pathophysiological events leading to death or disability. 39 If the proof were only that occupational disease passively contributed by making a worker less able to ward off effects of nonoccupational disease, it would not be sufficient to support a finding
that death or disability "resulted from" occupational disease. The
result is reached not only because the contribution was passive and
insignificant but also because the "proof" was merely an unexplained
conclusion. 40 The standard which amici advocated would instead require the medical expert to explain scientifically and rationally how
occupational disease actively and significantly contributed to disability or death. Such a test provides the cross-examiner with a base
from which to question the expert witness and forces the expert to
describe and explain the contribution made by the occupational disease to disability or death. This test addresses two of the system's
chief flaws: (1) it would help to eliminate the inequity of different
results reached under the same facts; and (2) it would help to assure
that the occupation truly caused the worker's death or disability.
In the Kusenko appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court encountered a rare opportunity to clarify a subject beset with legal
confusion. But it did not. Justice McDermott wrote the majority
opinion which remanded the case for a new decision consistent with
the following rule:
"Where there are multiple causes of death and the immediate cause was noncompensable, the requirements of Section
301(c)(2) [411(2)] may be met by a showing with unequivocal
medical evidence that the deceased suffered from an occupational disease, and that it was a substantial contributing
factor
41
among the secondary causes in bringing about death.

The court specifically rejected the "sole-or-direct-cause" standard as
"entirely too strict;" it also rejected the "any-contributing-cause"
38. Id. at 33.
39. Id. at 36.
40. Id. at 37, 40.
41. Kusenko 506 Pa. at 107, 484 A.2d at 376 (quoting McCloskey v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 501 Pa. 93, 101 460 A.2d 237, 241 (1983)). In Kusenko, the phrase
"resulting from" had been defined as a substantial contributing factor when death or disability
was due to multiple diseases which were both occupational and non-occupational. Logically,
this definition will extend to the case of a disabling or fatal disease due to multiple etiologies
which were both occupational and non-occupational. See notes 24, 25.

test as "too heavy a burden to place on industry."4 The court further commented that the Commonwealth Court's standard of any
contribution effectively reduced the Workmen's Compensation Act
"to a general health and insurance plan."
While agreeing with the test formulated by the majority, Justice
Hutchinson argued in his dissent that the Commonwealth Court decision should have been reversed and dismissed instead of remanded.' Justice Flaherty filed a separate dissenting opinion calling
for adoption of a stricter standard requiring a "direct causal relationship" between the occupational disease and the death."" Justice
Larson wrote a long and confusing dissent which argued for affirmance of the Commonwealth Court. Drawing on the act's humanita5
rian purposes, he called for adoption of the "any-contribution" test.
Significantly, Justice Larsen's extreme standard was rejected by all
six other justices.
With the court's retreat from the "any contributing cause"
standard to the requirement of "substantial contributing cause,"
Pennsylvania employers apparently won a great victory. More accurately, they averted a great disaster. Consider what the court in
Kusenko did not do. Also, consider the full implications of what it
did do. Presented with an opportunity to act boldly, the court could
have set for the nation a new standard of causation designed to promote accountability and fairness. It could have established a test by
which the medical expert is forced to explain how and why occupational disease had actively contributed to death or disability; instead,
it opted for unaccountability and caprice. The term "substantial contributing cause" is wholly subjective. Indeed, it may be indefinable.
If the medical expert testifies about contributing cause in a way
which makes the term "any" equivalent to the term "substantial"
will Kusenko have changed anything?
It will be interesting to follow Kusenko. The case was remanded
to the Commonwealth Court which in turn remanded it to the Appeal Board which will probably remand it to the referee. Should the
referee conduct a hearing and accept additional evidence, the claimant's same expert may appear to testify. If he offers the same opinion as before, but with sophistry adds the new "magic words" and
states that coal workers' pneumoconiosis had "substantially contributed" to death by making the miner less able to ward off lethal cancer, will Kusenko's new standard have made any difference? Under
42.
43.
44.
45.

Kusenko, 506 Pa. at 107-108, 484 A.2d at 376-377.
Id., at 121, 484 A.2d at 383.
Id., at 120, 484 A.2d at 383.
Id., at 109, 484 A.2d at 377.

the rule of Cushey," the expert's senseless opinion qualifies as substantial evidence even though it was earlier rejected for placing on
industry "too heavy a burden" and for reducing the Pennsylvania
Workmen's Compensation Act "to a general health and insurance
plan."4 7 Under the rule of Cushey, the referee's finding, based on
that opinion, would be unreviewable notwithstanding that the finding
conflicts with objectives and purposes of the law.
Kusenko is a flawed decision engrafted on an already flawed
system. The fundamental flaw is that the system does not demand
accountability or rationality in either expert testimony or fact-finding. Cushey has designated any medical opinion as substantial evidence even when it is not rational. Kusenko permits the medical
opinion to be merely a subjective expression of magic words. Together, Cushey and Kusenko exempt the expert witness from any
duty to provide a reasoned and sound explanation for his opinion.
Cushey, then, allows the referee to accept the expert's opinion, and it
makes the referee's finding unreviewable. Those who strive to bring
reason and accountability into the system are losing. Indeed, because
of recent "aggravation" decisions, the struggle may have already
been lost.
III. "Aggravation" and "Causation" and Sandusky

Since Pawlosky, Hayden

The struggle for reason and accountability now focuses on the
so-called "aggravation" cases. Reason is under assault as the Commonwealth Court creates new diseases unknown to medical science
and applies an "any contribution" standard as the causation criterion for its new diseases. Accountability is dissapating as the Commonwealth Court stretches employer liability to include morbid and
fatal conditions which are unrelated to the workplace and beyond
the employer's power to control.
Under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, the employer is liable for "personal injury" or "death" due to injury.4 8 The
46. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
47. Kusenko, 506 Pa. at 108, 484 A.2d at 377. Quoting McCloskey [supra note 41]
but ignoring Kusenko, a recent decision of the Commonwealth Court has restricted application
of the criterion of "substantial contributing cause" to the case in which the causal contribution
by occupational disease is merely "secondary"; when disability is due to occupational and nonoccupational diseases as "dual primary causes", " . .. [lt is sufficient if the occupational
disease materially contributed to the disability." Bethlehem Mines Corporation v. W.C.A.B.
(Luketich), Slip Opinion, Commwlth. Ct., 7 October 1985; allocatur to Supreme Court filed.
,501 A.2d
Pa. Commw. The case of Bureau of Workers' Compensation v. Uchaker, 703 (1985) establishes that indeed, Kusenko's new standard does not make any difference. In
Uchaker the court held that an expert's opinion that an occupational disease had been a "significant contributing factor" was sufficient to meet the Kusenko standard.
48. PWCA, PA. STAT. ANN. 77, § 431.

372

statute defines the word injury to mean "an injury to an employee,
regardless of his previous physical condition, arising in the course of
his employment and related thereto, and such disease or infection as
naturally results from the injury or is aggravated, reactivated or accelerated by the injury."49 The statute explicitly makes "occupational disease" an "injury. ' 50 Certain diseases which are known to be
caused by work are identified and listed in the statute as "scheduled" or "prescribed" occupational diseases. 5 1 If a work-connected
disease is not one of those specially prescribed, the "incidence" of it
must be "substantially greater" in the worker's industry or occupation than in the general population to qualify as an "occupational
52
disease."
This statutory scheme is not overly complex. It may be summarily stated as follows: (1) for an employer to be liable, the worker's
disabling "personal injury" or "death" must be caused by a workplace "injury," (2) the workplace "injury" must be induced by occupationally-related trauma or disease; and (3) if the inducement to
injury is occupationally-related disease, it must be characteristic of
the worker's occupation. The statutory scheme purports to bar compensation for disabling personal injury or death caused by a disease
which is not characteristic of the worker's occupation, even when
that disease undisputedly arose in the course of employment.5 Because this exclusion may bar otherwise valid claims, the national
trend is toward its elimination and extension of workers' compensation coverage to include all occupationally-related causes of disability or death. 4
Established and recognized states of disease which might qualify as compensable "injury" are properly grouped into four categories: (1) a disease wholly caused by a chronic workplace condition;
(2) a disease wholly caused by an acute workplace event; (3) a disease caused by aggravation of a pre-existing nonoccupational disease
by a chronic workplace condition; and (4) a state of disease caused
by aggravation of a pre-existing nonoccupational disease by an acute
workplace event.
With respect to unprescribed diseases wholly caused by chronic
49. PWCA,
50. PWCA,
51. PWCA,
silicosis, asbestosis
52.

PA. STAT. ANN. 77, [[ 411(1).
PA. STAT. ANN. 77, § 411(a).
PA. STAT. ANN. 77, § 27.1 (The prescribed occupational diseases include

and coal workers' pneumoconiosis.)

PWCA, PA. STAT. ANN. 77, § 27.1(n).
PA. STAT. ANN. 77, §§ 27.1, 411(1).

53.
54. Richman, Why Change? A Look at the Current System of Disability Determination and Workers' Compensation for Occupational Disease, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE
97: 908-914 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Why Change?]. Report of NAIC (National Association of Insurance Commissioners) Occupational Disease Advisory Committee, Occupational
Disease Issues, al (1985) [hereinafter cited as NAIC Report].

workplace conditions or acute workplace events, claimants have been
able to meet the burden of proof without difficulty by proving in lung
disease cases; (a) that the incidence of cough, wheeze and dyspnea is

substantially greater in the worker's occupation; 55 and (b) that disability or death resulted from a workplace "injury" induced by occupational disease." But cases involving a state of disease caused by
workplace aggravation of pre-existing nonoccupational disease have
presented difficulties.

Nationally, how to handle the issue of aggravation is unsettled.
The argument in support of compensation for aggravation is that

"an employer takes an employee with whatever underlying conditions the employee has." 57 The contrary argument is that medical
disorders which "may be aggravated but are not usually caused by
• .. employment" should not be compensable." In federal black
lung law, the Benefits Review Board rejected the "aggravation theory." 59 Within the state system, "there is a general willingness to
hold these cases compensable." 60
In Pennsylvania, the controversy appeared to be resolved by the
statutory statement that compensable "injury" includes within its
meaning "disease . . . [which] is aggravated . . . by the 'injury'
. . . regardless of. . . [the worker's] previous physical condition."'

However, the statute goes on to say that "[t]he term 'injury' . . .
shall include

. . .

occupational disease as defined in Section 27.1."6

For a disease to qualify as occupational this section requires that it
be a disease which is characteristic of the occupation. 3 Therefore,

perplexing questions of statutory construction remain: (1) Does "injury" include within its meaning a state of disease which is not itself
a recognized, separate "occupational disease" because it resulted

from workplace aggravation of a pre-existing nonoccupational disease? (2) If "injury" includes the disease state due to aggravation,
although not a recognized, separate disease, must the disease state
55. Crucible Steel Corp. v. Lockhart, 61 Pa. Commw. 500, 434 A.2d 242 (1981); Colt
Indus. v. Montgomery, 57 Pa. Commw. 463, 426 A.2d 743 (1981); Penn Del Supply Co. v.
Sharp, 47 Pa. Commw. 403, 408 A.2d 204 (1979); Roofner v. Schenley Distilleries, Inc. 38
Pa. Commw. 218, 392 A.2d 346 (1978); Henry v. Control Products Co., Inc., 36 Pa. Commw.
262, 387 A.2d 523 (1978); Scranton Garment Co. v. Crapella, 33 Pa. Commw. 190, 381 A.2d
210 (1977).
56. See supra notes 30, 52.
57. 43 C.F.R. § 727.202 (1978) 43 Fed. Reg. 36825, 18 Aug. 1978, Discussions and
Changes (b); Elisburg D: [Letter.] JAMA 1980; 244: 2158.
58. Report by the Comptroller General to the Congress of the United States: Legislature Authorized Benefits Without Adequate Evidence of Black Lung Disability, 20-21 (1982).
59. Ovies v. Director, 3 BLR 1-609 (1981). Vacated and remanded (on other grounds),
unpublished opinion (4th Cir., 1982).
60. NAIC Report, supra note 54, at 29.
61. PWCA, PA. STAT. ANN. 77, [[ 411(I).
62. PA. STAT. ANN. 77, § 411(2).
63. PA. STAT. ANN. 77, § 27.1(n).

be characteristic of the industry? (3) Is all of the harm following
workplace aggravation of pre-existing nonoccupational disease an
"injury in the course of employment?"
A.

New Diseases

Pennsylvania's seminal case on aggravation is Plasteel Product
Corp. v. Smith."' There, the claimant was previously employed as a
coal miner, in which capacity he was exposed to coal mine dust. In
his later position with the defendant's fabricating construction company, the claimant worked at sifting sand. The claimant contracted
lung disease from his exposure to coal dust. His condition was aggravated by exposure to sand dust in his later work for the defendant.6"
The incidence of aggravated disease was substantially greater in the
claimant's second occupation than among the general population.
The court, struggling with the issue, explicitly found that no new
disease had been caused by the claimant's work for the defendant
employer. It queried "whether an occupational disease type of harm
which does not rise to the level of an independent disease is also
included in the term [injury]." 66 The court resolved the question by
stating:
[T]he term "injury," when used in an occupational disease context, was intended to include occupation-related harm which
does not amount to a separate occupational disease . . .Therefore, a claimant who does not suffer from an occupational disease . . . may nevertheless demonstrate that
he sustained a dis67
ease-like injury . .

.

. (Emphasis added.)

The court went on to declare that the claimant was entitled to benefits because occupational aggravation of pre-existing disease is itself
an "injury."
In Plasteel, the adjudicators apparently did not comprehend
that pneumoconiosis is caused by both the dust of coal mines (coal
worker's pneumoconiosis and silicosis) and the dust of sand (silicosis) and that continued dust exposure can, through additive effect,
cause pneumoconiosis to progress. 68 If the adjudicators found that
the claimant's continued exposure to silica dust caused the claimant's pre-existing pneumoconiosis to progress to the level of disabling
impairment by adding to his lungs' dust burden, the adjudicators
could have, without difficulty, concluded that the claimant had pre64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

32 Pa. Commw. 405, 379 A.2d 908 (1977).
The medical basis for the finding of "aggravation" was not supplied.
Plasteel, 33 Pa. Commw. at 409-10, 379 A.2d at 910 (emphasis added).
Id.
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scribed pneumoconiotic diseases,6 9 that the claimant was entitled to
a presumption of disability due to occupational disease arising from
his last employment, 70 that the claimant's disabling "injury". "resulted from" his occupational disease 71 and that the employer was
liable for the claimant's "injury."72
Failing to perceive that Plasteel was a conventional case of occupational disease and fearing that the statutory definition of injury
precluded employer liability for a disease state which was not a recognized, separate disease, the court fashioned out of its concept of
"aggravation" a new and theretofore unknown clinical entity, which
it named "disease-like injury." Based upon a clinical creation, the
court upheld the award of benefits without deciding whether a disease-like injury was or was not an "occupational disease." This undecided question left unanswered these corollary questions: whether
a disease-like injury must be characteristic of the occupation; and
whether disability or death must result from it? By combining misunderstood medicine with shaky legal analysis, Plasteel transformed
disease-like injury into an unscientific and dubious medicolegal
disease.
For several years, the problem lay dormant. Then, during 19801981, the court decided three similar aggravation cases.73 In all
three, disability resulted from disease-like injury caused by chronic
workplace conditions which aggravated pre-existing non-occupational diseases. In addition, in each case the claimant proved that his
disease-like injury was characteristic of his occupation. Pursuant to
Plasteel, benefits were awarded. Left unaddressed were whether disease-like injury had to be characteristic of the occupation and
whether disability or death had to result from it. The court and litigants just assumed affirmative answers to these questions.
B. Definition of "Injury" and Requirements That Disease-Induced
"Injury" be Characteristicof Occupation
In 1983, the Commonwealth Court decided Palowski v. Latrobe
Brewing Co. 74 The claimant originally alleged disability caused by
an "occupational disease." He proved that chronic exposure to occupational fumes "aggravated a pre-existing asthmatic condition." The
claimant, however, "failed to present evidence that the incidence of
69. PWCA, PA. STAT. ANN. 77, § 27.1 (k) and (g).
70. PWCA, PA. STAT. ANN. 77, § 413.
71. See also Kusenko at 107, 484 A.2d at 376.
72. PWCA, PA. STAT. ANN. 77, §§ 301(a) and 431.
73. Armco Steel Corp. v. Kolar, 60 Pa. Commw. 195, 431 A.2d 363 (1981); Wagner
Elec. Corp. v. Erdman, 59 Pa. Commw. 617, 430 A.2d 701 (1981); Crucible Steel Corp. v.
Gilson, 52 Pa. Commw. 165, 415 A.2d 458 (1980).
74. Pawlosky v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 81 Pa. Commw. 270, 473 A.2d 260 (1984).

his disease-like injury was substantially greater in his occupation
than in the general population." 7 5 Therefore, he amended his claim
"to assert entitlement under the general compensation provisions of
the Act."7 Absent discussion or explanation, the court decided the
case with the following conclusory holding:
[I]t is clear that . . . [claimant] suffered an "injury".
In Plasteel . . . we held that the workplace aggravation of preexisting disease constitutes an "injury" . . . even when exposure-type harm does not reach the level of an independent occupational disease. In the instant case, the . . . [claimant's] disability was due to work-related agents which aggravated his
77
asthma condition. The statute requires him to prove no more.
Pawlosky represented a major departure from prior law. Without specifically addressing whether a disease-like injury was or was
not an "occupational disease," it seemed to hold that in an aggravation case involving disease-like injury, the claimant has a choice of
remedies. He can proceed as if his "injury" was caused by "occupational disease," or he can proceed as if it was not caused by occupational disease but rather was induced by occupationally-related
trauma. Because the claimant in Palowski opted to regard his "injury" as not caused by occupational disease, he was excused from
proving that his "injury" was characteristic of his occupation. It was
sufficient to prove that a chronic workplace condition caused his "injury" by aggravating his pre-existing nonoccupational disease. Two
years later in Sandusky v. Chicago Bridge & Iron,78 the claimant
proved that chronic occupational exposure to welding fumes aggravated his pre-existing nonoccupational emphysema. As in Pawlosky,
the claimant did not prove that his disease-like injury was characteristic of his occupation. On appeal, the claimant amended his petition
to deny that his "injury" was due to occupational disease and to
claim entitlement under the "general compensation provisions" of
the statute. On these facts, the court held that "the claimant would
' '79
be entitled to compensation under Pawlosky.
Pawlosky and Sandusky represent the current state of case law
relating to aggravation of pre-existing nonoccupational disease by
chronic workplace conditions. The medicolegal condition of diseaselike injury was originally created out of a sympathetic concern that
the disease caused by chronic aggravation did not qualify as a recognized, separate disease and an awareness that the statutory definition
75.
76.
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of injury precluded liability for a state of disease which did not so
qualify. Claimants sought legal recognition of the state of disease
due to aggravation as an independent occupational disease in order
to obtain for themselves the same treatment which the law provided
for victims of occupational disease. Ironically, Pawlosky and Sandusky corrupted "disease-like injury" by ruling that it was not occupational disease and by treating the "injury" which it caused as
traumatically induced. Aggravation is, therefore, like disease for the
purpose of defining injury but unlike disease for the purpose of deciding whether the condition must be characteristic of the worker's
occupation.
Pawlosky, was soon followed by another significant departure
from prior law. In Hayden v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.,80 the
cause of the claimant's disabling "injury" was an occupational episode of acute smoke inhalation. Under Pawlosky, the claimant could
have avoided proof that his injury was characteristic of his occupation by proving that smoke inhalation had aggravated his pre-existing health problem, hypersensitivity and asthma, thereby causing
"disease-like injury." Instead, the claimant established that his lung
disease was totally caused by inhaled smoke. Under the precedents,
without aggravation there should not have been "disease-like injury," and the case should have been treated as an ordinary workplace "injury" induced by a recognized, separate occupationally-related disease. However, the claimant did not prove that his
unprescribed disease was more prevalent in his occupation. Because
"occupational disease" must be characteristic of occupation, he
failed to prove that he had an "occupational disease." Since neither
aggravation nor occupational disease had been proven, the court had
to either make new law or deny benefits to a deserving worker who
was disabled by an acute event tantamount to a workplace "accident." The court chose to make new law. It held that the claimant
could elect to assert an "occupational disease type of harm" as a
disease-like injury and obtain benefits absent proof of both aggravation and occupational disease by establishing only that the "injury"
was wholly caused by his occupation."' It further held that "when a
claim for an occupational disease type of harm is asserted . . . a
claimant need no longer prove that the harm sustained is occupa82
tional in nature."
The Hayden case was soon followed by Stover v. W.C.A.B.8" In
80.
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Stover, the court held that "essential, hypertension [wholly] caused
by the emotional stress and strain of claimant's work environment"
was an "injury" which did not have to be a characteristic of the
occupation because it was not an "occupational disease."8 In Hayden, the etiology was an acute event; in Stover, the etiology was a
chronic condition. As a result of the Hayden and Stover decisions,
proof that the disease-induced "injury" is characteristic of the
worker's occupation is no longer a requirement in both acute and
chronic cases in which the "injury" was wholly caused by workplace
conditions. By excising this requirement, Hayden and Stover moved
Pennsylvania into the legal mainstream.8 5 Having done so, they provoke these questions: should statutory surgery, as radical as that performed by Hayden and Stover, be performed legislatively and not
judicially; and if by judicial procedure, should it be in and by reported decisions which specifically address and decide the issue?
Many respond "yes" to both interrogatories.
In the latest court decision, Arlington Auto Body Serv. v.
Bosack,86 the claimant asserted that his pre-existing lung disease caused by allergies and cigarettes - had been aggravated by an
acute occupational episode involving inhalation of paint fumes. By
following the precedent set by Pawlosky, the court could have easily
decided for the claimant by finding that the claimant had a diseaselike injury. Citing Hayden instead, the majority ruled that the
claimant's disabling "single injury" was an "occupational disease
type of harm" that qualified as an "injury" which did not need to be
"occupational in nature. '8 7 In so deciding, the court ignored facts
which were common to Arlington and Pawloski; both involved occupational aggravation of pre-existing nonoccupational disease. The
court also ignored the distinction between Arlington and Hayden. In
Hayden, the occupational agent "caused" all of the harm and did
not merely aggravate pre-existing disease. The court did not discuss
what is common to both Hayden and Arlington (and what distinghuishes Arlington from Pawlosky. In both Hayden and Arlington the "injury" had been due to an acute episode tantamount to an
occupational accident, whereas in Pawlosky the injury had been secondary to chronic work conditions.
Hayden and Arlington together establish that in cases where an
acute occupational event tantamount to "accident" causes the harm,
it is a disease-like injury without regard to whether the acute event
84.
85.
86.
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caused all of the harm or only aggravated pre-existing disease. In all
cases of acute occupational events, the "injury" can be designated an
occupational disease-like harm instead of an occupational disease.
As a result of the series of decisions just reviewed, it will not be
necessary to prove that the "injury" is characteristic of the worker's
occupation in any of these situations: (a) in all cases of acute workplace events; (b) when a separate, unprescribed disease is wholly
caused by chronic workplace conditions; and (c) when a "disease-like
injury" results from chronic workplace aggravation of pre-existing
nonoccupational illness. In short, in every type of case except that of
a prescribed disease, a "disease-like injury" case may be claimed
and filed under the "general compensation provisions" of the Act.
When instead an election is made to have a case considered as a
claim of "occupational disease," the claimant becomes burdened
with proving that the injury is characteristic of the worker's occupation. 88 In the case of a separate, prescribed disease, that burden is
carried easily by statutory definition."' In all other cases, the prudent
claimant will elect against occupational disease treatment, and the
burden will be avoided.
C.

Causation Criteria

In Kusenko, the court held that "occupational disease" must be
a substantial contributing factor in causing death. What, then, is the
causation criterion when disease-like injury contributed to death or
disability? 90
In Lersch v. City of Pittsburgh,9 1 the claimant, a fire fighter,
suffered totally disabling myocardial infarctions soon after he retired. The referee found that the infarctions "were caused by a hypertensive and arteriosclerotic heart disease . . . [which] did not
arise directly out of his employment." 92 The referee also found that
"claimant's employment had . . .contributed to or aggravated his
heart disease."9 " Citing Plasteel for guidance, the court declared the
claimant's diseased state to be due to "the work-related aggravation
of a pre-existing disease." 94 Because the claimant's "injury" was not
due to "occupational disease," the court reasoned that the causation
88. See Pawlosky v. Latrobe Brewing Co. 81 Pa. Commw. 270, 473 A.2d 260 91984)
and Sandusky v. Chicago Bridge & Iron, 37 Pa. Commw. 605, 487 A.2d 1019 (1984).
89. PWCA PA. STAT. ANN. 77, § 27.1
90. When compensation is claimed for a fatality which is not due to "occupational
disease," the phrase resulting from again applies, but within this context, it remains undefined.
As for disability which is not due to "occupational disease," the phrase is inapplicable. See PA.
STAT. ANN. 77, § 411(1).
91. Lersch v. City of Pittsburgh, 87 Pa. Commw. 244, 487 A.2d 66 (1985).
92. Id. at 246, 487 A.2d at 67.
93. Id. at 248, 487 A.2d at 68.
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criterion of "substantial contributing cause" did not apply. The
claimant had met his burden by proving "that his employment contributed to or aggravated his heart disease." 95 Lersch implied that
"any contribution" is the causation criterion applicable to diseaselike injury due to aggravation of pre-existing disease.
The inference was later made more explicit in Sandusky." The
claimant, a welder, had pre-existing nonoccupational genetic emphysema. The referee found that the claimant "'failed to show .. that
the aggravation of his genetic emphysema, by his exposure to the
gases and dust involved with electric arc welding, was anything more
than . . . 'a' contributing cause, along with other nonoccupational
lung irritants to his pulmonary disability.' "' Labeling the disabling
harm as "a disease-like injury" and citing Pawlosky as authoritative
precedent, the court held that the claimant was entitled to compensation because "work-related gases and dust had aggravated the
claimant's pre-existing lung disease to the point of total disability." 98
The implication of Sandusky is that "aggravation to the point of
disability" is equivalent to "a contributing cause."
Does Sandusky, in combination with Lersch, hold that "any
contribution" is the causation criterion applicable to cases of diseaselike injury due to aggravation? By dispensing with "aggravation" as
a condition for finding disease-like injury, had Hayden extended the
criterion of any contribution to cases of "disease-like injury" wholly
caused by acute occupational exposure? What is the standard applicable to a "disease-like injury" wholly caused by chronic workplace
conditions like hypertension? Have Sandusky, Hayden and Stover
limited the standard of "substantial contributing cause" to cases of
prescribed occupational disease as decided in Kusenko? Has the
threat to industry, which the court sought to avert in Kusenko, been
resurrected by those decisions of the Commonwealth Court which
have created disease-like injury and then declared it not to be an
"occupational disease?" Is the employer now liable for disability or
death when his contribution was less than "substantial" because full
liability follows from "any" contribution? By making the employer
fully liable for disability or death when his contribution had been
insignificant, the employer is held totally responsible for his employee's health even though important health risks are not related to
work and are beyond the employer's power to control. Has the social
policy of employer accountability for workplace conditions been
thereby damaged?
95.
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D. Apportionment
Under the statute, the employer is liable only for "compensation
for . . . injury in the course of employment." 9 The employer should,
therefore, not be liable for harm which is unrelated to the workplace.
If a worker's totally disabling pulmonary impairment is due ninety
percent to smoking and ten percent to industrial dust, should the
employer's liability be only for ten percent of the compensation benefit, because workplace "injury" had caused only ten percent of the
disability? After all, "[a]n employer cannot force an employee to
cease smoking . . .10o
Barth and Hunt remark, "When the disease is partially caused
or exacerbated by the workers' cigarette smoking, the burden of
compensation ought not to fall entirely on the employer because a
disability that is intentionally or willfully inflicted is not customarily
compensable." 1'0 In Pennsylvania, the statute provides that "no compensation shall be paid when the injury or death is self-inflicted."' 0 2
The statement of Barth and Hunt and the Pennsylvania statute both
recognize the principle, which should be basic to workers' compensation law, that an employer is legally accountable only for those workplace conditions which he can influence.
Several jurisdictions have confronted the unfairness of making
the employer pay for the non-work-related portion of a worker's disability by resort to use of apportionment techniques. 103 Interpreting
the apportionment law of its state, the Supreme Court of West Virginia, in a case of totally disabling pulmonary impairment due forty
percent to occupational pneumoconiosis and sixty percent to unknown cause, held that the claimant was entitled only to forty percent of the compensation benefit. The court explained, "Workmen's
compensation covers only occupational diseases; a disability resulting
from the normal diseases of life was not intended to be compensated
under the statute."' 1 4 Barth and Hunt comment, "[A]pportionment
rules mitigate the harshness of the doctrine that the employer takes
the worker as he finds him . . . [and] may contribute marginally to
."o5 One commentator, how*.".
programs to hire the handicapped .
ever, sees apportionment as a program of "harshness" to workers. 06
By expressly limiting employer liability to "injury in the course
99. PA. STAT. ANN. 77, §§ 431, 411(1).
100. BARTH & HUNT, supra note 36, at 263.
101. Id. at 263.
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104. Mullins v. State Workmen's Compensation Com., 271 S.E.2d 771 (W. Va. 1980).
105. BARTH & HUNT, supra note 36, at 119.
106. LARSON, Workmen's Compensation § 59.20 (1978).

of employment," the Pennsylvania statute may provide an apportionment scheme which has thus far escaped recognition. If any contribution to death or disability triggers full liability, employers seeking
protection from that inequitable burden might resort to the statutory
provisions which explicitly limit employer liability only to "compensation for . . . injury arising in the course of employment or related
thereto." 10 7 In cases of aggravation, that "injury" is just the "disease-like injury," i.e., only that part of the worker's disease-state
caused by workplace conditions or events to the exclusion of that
part of the disease-state due to pre-existing nonoccupational disease.
Adoption of this interpretation would restore employer accountability by limiting employer liability to workplace conditions and events
over which the employer has control.
IV.

Conflict Between Case Law and Social Policy

,Judicial case law is the system's intended vehicle for advancing
social policy objectives of workers' compensation. Among the important objectives in the occupational disease setting are these: (1) assuring that decisions on claims are rational and based on sound medical evidence; 10 8 (2) assuring that decisions are unbiased and accord
equal protection of the law to all litigants; and, (3) encouraging employers to improve workplace safety and health' 0 9 by making them
accountable for workplace conditions which they can control.
Pennsylvania case law has run counter to these objectives. It has
qualified unsound medical opinion as "substantial evidence" l0 and
has thereby made the expert medical witness unaccountable to the
disciplines of science. It has exempted irrational referee findings
from meaningful appellate review"' and thereby has made the referee - already unaccountable to political oversight by reason of his
civil service status"' - further unaccountable to the legal system.
For standards of causation, Pennsylvania has accepted criteria
which are wholly subjective"' and which may not provide equal protection of the law to litigants. By accepting from referees cryptic
conclusions instead of well-reasoned decisions,"' Pennsylvania courts
shield bias and wrongful disregard of significant evidence.
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Without valid reason, case law created a medicolegal disease,
named "disease-like injury," which is not recognized by medical science. " 5 In order to make this new medicolegal disease consistently
compensable, case law has declared "aggravation" to be like "occupational disease" when defining "injury" ' 6 but not like "occupational disease" when "aggravation" is uncharacteristic of the industry." 7 After expanding the concept of medicolegal disease to include
all unprescribed diseases" 8 case law proceeded to offer to claimants
an illogical choice - they could treat unprescribed occupational
maladies as due either to occupational trauma or to occupational
disease." 9
When a claimant's malady is due to "occupational disease,"' 20
the contribution by it to disability or death should be "substantial"
so that industry is not excessively burdened.' 2 ' However, case law
has made "any" contribution sufficient for employer liability when
the claimant elects to treat his unprescribed ailment as "traumaticdisease-like-injury.' 22 Case law has consequently made the employer liable for genetic or self-inflicted disease conditions which
lack a significant relationship to employment. In doing so, it has undermined the principle of employer accountability for the condition
of the workplace. By fostering employer liability for states of disease
caused by conditions over which the employer has no power to control, Pennsylvania courts have discouraged efforts to improve workplace conditions. Such efforts appear futile from the employer's
perspective.
The direction of Pennsylvania's law of workers' compensation in
the occupational disease area is unhealthy. However, the unhealthy
state of the law is curable by restoring reason and accountability to
the system.
V.

Conclusion

Recent occupational disease decisions of Pennsylvania courts
clash with important policy objectives of workers' compensation law.
By qualifying unsound medical opinion as "substantial evidence,"
these decisions have made the expert medical witness unaccountable
to the disciplines of science. By exempting irrational referee findings
from meaningful appellate review, they have made the referee unac115.
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countable. By accepting causation criteria which are wholly subjective, they threaten litigants with denial of equal protection of law. By
accepting from referees cryptic conclusions instead of well-reasoned
decisions, they shield bias and wrongful disregard of significant evidence. For no valid reason, these decisions have created a medicological disease unknown to medicine and have used that "disease"
without consistency or logic. They have also made the employer liable for genetic or self-inflicted disease conditions which lack a significant relationship to employment. The effect of these decisions has
been to promote irrationality and to impair accountability within the
system.

